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Effects of Classification Context on Categorization in Natural Categories 
 
The pattern of classification of borderline instances of eight common taxonomic categories was 
examined under three different instructional conditions to test two predictions.  First that lack of a 
specified context contributes to vagueness in categorization, and second that altering the purpose 
of classification to can lead to greater or lesser dependence on similarity in classification.  
Instructional conditions contrasted purely pragmatic with more technical/quasi legal contexts as 
purposes for classification, and these were compared with a no-context control.  Measures of 
category vagueness comprised between-subjects disagreement and within-subjects consistency, 
while measures of similarity-based categorization comprised category breadth and the correlation 
of instance categorization probability with mean rated typicality independently measured in a 
neutral context.  Contrary to predictions, none of the measures of vagueness, reliability, category 
breadth, or correlation with typicality were generally affected by the instructional setting as a 
function of pragmatic versus technical purposes.  Only one sub-condition in which a situational 
context was implied in addition to a purposive context produced a significant change in 
categorization.  Further experiments demonstrated that the effect of context was not increased 
through having participants talk their way through the task, and that a technical context did not 
show any more all-or-none categorization than a pragmatic context.  The findings place an 
important boundary condition on the effects of instructional context on conceptual categorization. 
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A phenomenon of major importance for psychological theories of concepts is the 
"vagueness" of many of our conceptual categories.  While every category can be said to have clear 
members (for example a chair is clearly a type of furniture) and clear non-members (a cucumber is 
clearly not a type of furniture), there are also instances which are borderline to a category.  When 
asked to decide whether rugs, paintings or televisions are types of furniture, people are frequently 
uncertain about the answer.  There is a vagueness in our use of common language terms that 
arguably makes such questions undecidable.  The problem of vagueness poses serious threats to 
many accounts of the semantics of natural language (Keefe & Smith, 1997; Osherson & Smith, 
1997), and so the issue of what gives rise to the phenomenon is of central importance to theories 
of cognition. 
There have been many demonstrations of vagueness.  For example McCloskey and 
Glucksberg (1978) presented two groups of students with lists of words each headed by a category 
name such as fruit or fish.  One group was asked to give typicality ratings, saying how typical or 
representative each word was of the category as a whole.  The other group made a simple Yes/No 
categorization decision about each word, and returned four weeks later to make the same decision 
again.  Many items in the lists showed a high level of disagreement between participants, and poor 
test-retest reliability or consistency.  These items also tended to be borderline in terms of their 
rated typicality in the category. 
In a subsequent re-analysis of McCloskey and Glucksberg's data, Hampton (1998) showed 
that categorization probability for an item was closely related to rated typicality by a simple 
monotonically increasing threshold function.  List items that deviated from this standard function 
tended to be unfamiliar, or might be a part or property of an instance rather than an instance itself.  
For biological categories cases also could deviate from the function if they had the appearance of 
a category member without technically belonging to it, or if conversely they technically belonged 
to a category while not sharing appearance features.  From this analysis, Hampton (1998) argued 
that categorization decisions are to a large extent based on the same “family resemblance” 
semantic information as is used in judging typicality.  An item is judged a category member if the 
similarity between the item and the prototype for the category passes some threshold value.  
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Because both the concepts retrieved and the threshold criterion may vary across occasions, the 
probability of categorization rises as a monotone threshold function of the semantic similarity of 
the instance and category concepts. 
Why should categorization be so unstable at the category borderline?  Barsalou (1987) 
argued that instability could reflect variation between individuals in their conceptual 
representations or in their recent experience with a category.  However it is also possible that 
instability in categorization results from the lack of a specific context with respect to which the 
categorization has to be made.  In every day language, words are used in specific contexts with 
specific communicative goals, and this contextual support is missing in standard categorization 
experiments.  If individuals respond to the lack of context by arbitrarily constructing one of their 
own, then differences in the resulting conceptual representations would create instability. 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate variation in categorization resulting 
from a particular type of contextual source.  It has been argued (Braisby, 1993; Braisby & Franks, 
1997, 2000; Braisby, Franks & Harris, 1997) that a major source of instability and vagueness in 
categorization judgments is the lack of any explicit context for the categorization.  If asked 
whether a television is furniture, someone may give a different reply if the question is asked in the 
context of designing the look of a living room, as opposed to planning the need for electrical 
outlets in the home.  The purpose for which a classification is made may be crucial to how it is 
performed.  Braisby and Franks (1997) went so far as to argue that the lack of a clear context, or 
perspective, may be a major reason that categories appear to be so vague (see also Rey, 1983).  
According to their position, the observed vagueness of categories is in large part the result of 
categorizers selecting at random different well-defined concepts relevant to different contexts or 
“perspectives”.  As individuals recruit their own default context to the task, so differences of 
opinion about categorization may be more apparent than real.  The hypothesis resonates with 
Barsalou’s (1987) proposal that people construct category representations “on the fly” as different 
tasks are presented to them, so that there is inherent instability in the information represented in 
working memory on any one occasion of categorization. 
Several studies have deliberately manipulated context in categorization tasks (for a review 
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see Murphy, 2002, pp. 413-422).  For example Roth and Shoben (1983) varied sentential contexts 
as in "The bird crossed the farmyard", and showed through measures of sentence processing that 
the context could lead to reversal of normal typicality effects (for example “chicken” was read 
faster than “robin”).  Barsalou and Sewell (Barsalou, 1987) showed that asking participants to take 
the point of view of (say) a suburban housewife as opposed to a “red-neck” farmer produced 
marked changes in the typicality ranking of instances within categories such as vehicles or foods.  
In both these studies, situational context was manipulated, and marked effects were observed on 
the relative typicality and ease of processing of different category instances.  Another important 
demonstration of shifts in categorization with context was provided by Medin et al. (1997).  
Different groups of tree experts sorted trees by similarity.  Depending on whether the experts were 
taxonomists, landscape gardeners or parks maintenance staff, the structure observed was very 
different.  Each group had important dimensions of similarity not used by the others that were 
relevant to their own profession. 
Our experiments differed from these studies in several ways.  First, we focused not on the 
situational context of a classification, but rather on its purpose.  It is clear that when considering 
animals in the situational context of eating them as opposed to animals in the context of inviting 
them into your home, you will adopt very different views of what instances make typical 
candidates.  However it is a largely unexplored question whether, differences in expertise aside, 
changing the purpose for which a classification is to be used will generate such shifts.  Second, 
our experiments differed from many previous studies in that rather than measuring typicality 
structure, we measured changes in categorization itself.  We wished to explore whether an item 
would be considered to be a member of the category in one purposive context but not a member of 
the same category in another.  If category vagueness is in part owing to contextual ambiguity, it is 
clearly important to show that context can affect categorization decisions as well as typicality 
structures.  Finally we wished to explore the possibility that disagreement and inconsistency 
would be reduced when a clear purposive context for classification was provided. 
In an unpublished study, Braisby & Franks (2000) found evidence that categorization 
could be strongly influenced by shifting perspectives.  They contrasted two types of borderline 
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instance for natural kind classes – those that had the appearance but not the essence (for example 
an Easter egg as an egg), and those that had the essence but not the appearance (for example a 
scrambled egg as an egg.) People were asked to judge whether it was appropriate to use the word 
“egg” to talk about each object.  In a series of studies they showed that the relative frequency with 
which these two types of instance were categorized as eggs depended on a number of factors.  
Taking the perspective of a sculptor rather than a biologist naturally put more weight on 
appearance.  Imagining speaking to an adult non-native speaker led to more weight for essence, 
whereas imagining speaking to a 4-year-old child led to more weight on appearance.  If the 
purpose of using the word was in conversation or in defining a meaning more weight was placed 
on essence, whereas using a word for picking an object from an array switched the weight to 
appearance.  Focusing on “true classification” rather than appropriateness of word use shifted 
weight onto essence.  It is clear therefore that communicative setting and purpose can be very 
influential in affecting categorization, at least as shown in people’s judgments of appropriate 
words to use for objects.  Our aim was to determine how general this effect may be, looking at a 
wider range of categories and borderline cases, and additionally measuring the consistency with 
which people make their judgments. 
To test whether vagueness is owing to a lack of information about the purpose of 
classification, we aimed to provide participants with a clear perspective from which to make their 
categorizations.  If the purpose of categorization is made clear, then there should be less 
vagueness.  The first experiment therefore employed three categorization conditions.  One 
condition (the No-Context Control) was a simple context-free categorization task, while the 
remaining two conditions offered different scenarios, explaining the purpose and importance of 
the classifications.  The first prediction for this factor was that providing a specific context of 
some kind would lead to less individual disagreement and inconsistency, that is, less vagueness. 
The second prediction concerned the kind of categorization context provided, and the 
degree to which categorization would be dissociable from similarity to the category prototype.  
Hampton (1998) argued that the degree to which categorization probability is a simple monotone 
function of typicality can be taken as a test of the degree to which participants are simply 
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categorizing on the basis of similarity to prototype, as opposed to using a more complex 
explanation-based or theory-driven decision process.  For example in biological categories (but 
not others) categorization probability was not well correlated with typicality for items that were 
technically in categories different from their appearance (for example whales and bats). 
The importance of causal-explanatory theories for categorization has been well established 
(Ahn et al., 2000, Murphy & Medin, 1985).  Rips (1989) has argued that similarity is only a crude 
approximation to the basis on which people categorize the world.  Under the right circumstances it 
is possible to show that categorization and typicality judgments may be dissociated, as people turn 
for categorization to deeper core information about a concept and ignore superficial appearance 
(Ahn & Dennis, 2001).  We hypothesized that depending on the classification context, similarity 
may turn out to be a more or less appropriate basis for categorization.  For example when setting 
up a news/interest group on the subject of fish, it would be appropriate to use a “loose” category 
of fish, that could include shell fish or dolphins along with “true” fish such as cod or trout.  On the 
other hand when preparing a scientific report on the ecological status of different species, it would 
be more appropriate to use a quasi-biological definition for fish, which would exclude these items, 
but might instead include seahorses.  Our choice of contexts was designed to take advantage of 
this intuition that there may be more technical and more pragmatic forms of categorization.  In the 
Technical Condition, the purpose of categorization had a technical foundation, based on scientific 
or legislative goals, while in the Pragmatic Condition, the purpose was more loosely practical, 
based on providing a classification that would be easy to use, and match people’s general 
expectations.  We predicted that a pragmatic context would be more likely to reveal similarity-
based categorization, since it would place things in categories where the mass of people would 
expect to find them.  Categorization would therefore rely more on the “identification schema” or 
prototype of a concept, and less on its core definition.  A technical context however should 
encourage participants to use deeper causal-explanatory schemas for categorization, in which the 
relation of categorization to typicality was less direct.  In order to test the degree to which 
categorization was based on similarity, correlations were calculated across items of the probability 
of categorization with the mean rated typicality provided by an independent group of participants.  
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A further measure to be compared between these conditions was the overall threshold 
criterion used for categorization in each category (Hampton, 1995).  We expected that in a 
pragmatic context, people would take a broad view of what may be included in a category, 
whereas in a technical context, the category boundary would be drawn more tightly.  The No-
Context condition was predicted to be intermediate between these two. 
A final source of interest in the task came from possible differences between categories in 
the degree to which they would be affected by contextual instructions.  There has been 
considerable interest in domain differences in the way that concepts are represented (Barr & 
Caplan, 1987; Estes, 2003; Kalish, 1995).  Although the design of the experiment was too small to 
permit adequate sampling from different semantic domains, we deliberately chose categories from 
four different ontological domains in order to provide a broad range of materials.  Two biological 
kinds, fish and insects, were expected to show marked differences between technical and other 
contexts, because of the existence of biological definitions for these terms.  Two artifact kinds, 
tools and furniture were expected also to show changes across condition on the basis that technical 
contexts would place greater weight on the utility or function of the objects, which may provide 
the central core of artifact concepts (Bloom, 1996).  Finally there were two categories of edible 
plants, fruits and vegetables, and two social activities, sports and sciences, where the technical 
contexts were expected to tap other possible forms of theoretical knowledge and beliefs.  While 
these pairs of semantic categories were clearly not unbiased samples of their respective domains, 
it was intended that analysis at the level of individual categories could provide indicative evidence 
of any strong and systematic domain differences that may exist. 
To recap, we predicted first that adding any context at all would reduce vagueness, and 
second that technical contexts would contrast with pragmatic contrasts by inducing tighter 
category boundaries and a reduction in the dependence of categorization on similarity, as seen in 
the correlation with typicality. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  100 students at the University of Chicago volunteered for the experiment in 
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return for a small payment.  All were fluent speakers of English. 
Materials.  The categories and items used are shown in Appendix A.  There were 24 items 
in each of 8 categories.  Items were selected from category norms (Battig & Montague, 1969; 
Hampton & Gardiner, 1983; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and were 
designed to include clear members and nonmembers of the category, together with a substantial 
number of possible borderline cases to provide a measure of how vagueness and category 
membership changes with context.  Examples of scenarios for each condition are given in 
Appendix B.  The aim for the Technical Condition was to provide a legalistic or scientific context 
stressing the important consequences of making a correct classification.  For fish and insects the 
classification was to be used by a government agency for monitoring the ecological performance 
of different nations.  For fruits and vegetables, the classification was concerned with economics 
and trade.  For furniture and tools the context involved tax regulations, while for sports and 
science the context was concerned with appropriate use of funds by government agencies.  In the 
Pragmatic Condition, the stories were concerned with placing things in categories where people 
would expect to find them, so that they would be easily found.  A variety of contexts were used, 
including an Internet news group (for fish and insects), a mail-order catalogue (for fruits and 
vegetables), a department store database for monitoring stock (for furniture and tools) and a 
library index (for sports and science).  Finally, the No-Context condition had the same instructions 
for all categories: "Consider each of the following items and decide whether they belong in the 
category of _____". 
Design.  There were four groups of participants.  One group of 40 students provided 
typicality ratings.  Three other groups of 20 students each made Yes/No categorization judgments, 
according to the three conditions.  Categorization was retested 3-4 weeks later. 
Procedure.  Participants were given booklets to complete under supervision.  Order of 
categories within booklets and words within categories was balanced.  Participants were asked to 
read the scenario and judge each item by circling a choice of Y (Yes), N (No) or Ø (meaning of 
word unknown).  After 3 to 4 weeks, participants repeated the task with instructions to make fresh 
judgments without trying to recall earlier decisions.   A new random order of categories was used.  
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The Typicality Rating condition used standard typicality instructions, using a scale from 1 to 10 
(10 most typical) following McCloskey & Glucksberg (1978): 
"...rate each word according to how typical or atypical it is as a member of the category 
…decide how good or representative an example each word is of the category named…”   
An example was then given for the category of flowers.  Item and category order were 
counterbalanced as for the other conditions.  Typicality ratings were not subjected to a retest. 
Results 
For each item in each of the 3 categorization conditions, the probability of a yes response was 
calculated, based on the two responses made by each participant in each condition.  Reliability of 
the probabilities (mean .99) and the mean typicality ratings (mean .96) was uniformly high. 
Inter-Subject Agreement.  The first measure of category vagueness was inter-subject 
agreement.  The addition of contextual instructions was predicted to reduce contextual ambiguity 
so that people would agree more on the categorization of items.  The left-hand panel of Table 1 
shows disagreement measured as the proportion of Non-Modal Responses, NMR, the proportion 
of participants giving a No response when the majority said Yes, or saying Yes when the majority 
said No.  Overall, as predicted there was slightly more disagreement in the No-Context condition 
(18.6%) than in the other conditions (17.1% and 18.0%, SE 1%).  These means are for all items, 
including clear members and non-members.  NMR rose to a maximum of around 35% for items at 
the center of the typicality scale (as in McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978), leaving plenty of 
opportunity for a reduction in its value.  ANOVAs by subjects and items were run with Category 
and Condition as factors. There was no overall effect of condition (F1 < 1), and nor was the 
planned comparison between the No Context Condition and the others significant (t(57) = 0.9, 
NS).  There was therefore no evidence that providing a context increased inter-subject agreement.  
With alpha = .05, estimated power to detect a difference in condition means of as much as 5% 
between the No-Context and the other conditions was greater than 97%.  (In reporting power 
estimations, the lower of the two powers (items or subjects) is always quoted.) 
Otherwise, there was a significant main effect of category, (F1(7,399) = 9.78, p < .001, 
F2(7,184) = 2.34, p = .026), attributable to greater agreement about the four biological categories 
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than about the activity and artifact categories (mean NMR = 14.6 and 21.2 respectively).  There 
was no interaction between condition and category. In summary, in none of the categories was the 
No-Context condition clearly subject to greater disagreement than all the others.  Our expectation 
that a more specific categorization context would generally reduce category vagueness as indexed 
by levels of disagreement was not supported. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Within Subject Consistency.  The second measure of vagueness was the test-retest 
consistency of categorization responses.  Addition of a context was predicted to improve the 
stability of categorization decisions by reducing contextual ambiguity.  If an item is categorized in 
relation to a contextualized concept, then recall of the same context should facilitate consistent 
responding.  Note that if different individuals contextualized the concepts in  idiosyncratic ways, 
then NMR would remain high, but consistency should still improve relative to the No-Context 
condition.  The right-hand panel of Table 1 shows consistency as the percentage of responses that 
were the same on retest.  On average, the same response was given 90% of the time.  This level of 
consistency compares with a mean level of 88% in McCloskey and Glucksberg’s (1978) data, and 
includes clear members and non-members.  At the middle of the typicality scale mean consistency 
fell to around 82%.  There was no tendency for contexts to increase consistency.  Mean values 
across conditions varied very little, from 91% for the Pragmatic condition to 89% for the 
Technical condition (SE = 0.7%).  In ANOVAs, only the main effect of category was significant 
in both analyses.  Estimated power to detect the contrast between the No-Context and the other 
conditions was 70% for a difference in means of 3%, and 97% for a difference of 5% (alpha = .05, 
2-tailed).  The effect of category again showed up as a difference between the biological and food 
categories (92%) and the others (88%).  In summary, the main prediction of lower consistency in 
the No-Context control condition was not supported. 
Relation of Categorization to Typicality.  The next analysis considered the correlation 
between categorization probability in each of the categorization contexts and the mean rated 
typicality of the items.  To the extent that a high correlation is observed between categorization 
probability and typicality, it may be concluded that categorization is based on similarity, and for 
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this reason we had argued that Pragmatic Contexts should show higher correlations with typicality 
than Technical Contexts. To illustrate these correlations for “default” categorization, Figure 1 
shows scatter plots for each of the categories between probability of categorization in the No-
Context condition (y-axis) and rated typicality (x-axis).  It can be seen that for all categories 
except for sport, there was a strong and systematic relation between the two measures.  The left-
hand panel of Table 2 shows the correlations between typicality and categorization probability. 
All correlations were high (the mean correlation of .95 was close to the theoretical maximum 
imposed by the reliabilities of the measures), and differences between the three overall 
correlations by condition were slight, and not statistically significant (χ2(2) = 2.01, p > .10, 
Weatherburn, 1961, pp. 203-205).  Estimated power to detect a difference in mean correlations 
significant at .05 between any two conditions of as little as .95 versus .90 was over 90%.  Taking 
the full set of 24 correlations as a whole however, there was evidence for non-homogeneity 
(χ2(23) = 43.4, p < .01), suggesting that some individual correlations were significantly lower than 
the rest. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In this instance, it was quite easy to find plausible accounts for the cells in the correlation 
matrix with lower coefficients.  The biological and food categories had uniformly high 
correlations with typicality, (.94 or greater).  Categorization of sports correlated less well with 
Typicality except in the Pragmatic Condition, whereas for tools and furniture it was the Pragmatic 
Condition that showed a lower correlation.  Borderline sports activities could be divided into two 
groups, those involving physical exercise but little skill (for example aerobics and jogging), and 
those involving skill but no physical effort (croquet, billiards, and darts).  In the Pragmatic 
condition rated typicality was a good predictor of categorization probability for both groups.  For 
the other contexts however, the categorization placed more emphasis on skills than on physical 
effort, so that rated typicality over-predicted the categorization of aerobics and jogging, and 
under-predicted the categorization of croquet, billiards, and darts as sports.  The upper panel in 
Figure 2 shows the effect for the Technical Condition, in which a categorization was required for 
use in Sports Funding decisions.  The similarity between the Technical and the No-Context 
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conditions for sports suggests interestingly that the default categorization of sports also places 
greater weight on the skills aspects of sports than is seen in typicality judgments. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Tools and furniture showed reduced correlations with typicality in the Pragmatic 
Condition only.  These scenarios involved devising a database for employees in a department 
store, so that they could check on the availability of different items.  Participants appear to have 
adopted the layout of department stores as a guide to categorization.  For example, electrical 
appliances of various kinds were less likely to be counted as furniture, since in many department 
stores they would be in the electrical goods department rather than the furniture department (see 
lower panel, Figure 2).  This strategy was also accompanied by higher consistency for these two 
categories in the Pragmatic Condition (.90 and .93) compared with the other conditions (values 
ranging from .85 to .89), and for tools it also was accompanied by a reduction in Non Modal 
Responses.  Note that the reduction in vagueness and the reduced correlation with typicality were 
produced only in those context-category combinations that allowed a situational context to be 
imagined.  Providing a purpose for the classification per se had no discernible effect overall, yet 
the dependent measures were sensitive to situational context effects. 
The high overall level of the correlations was obviously affected by the presence in the 
lists of clear members and non-members.  Removing items with less than 10% NMR left between 
9 and 19 borderline items in each list.  With reduced range and reliability, mean correlation 
between typicality and categorization fell to 0.85, and the four correlations identified before were 
the only ones to fall below 0.8. 
Criterion.  A further important way in which context could affect categorization is in terms 
of the breadth of the categories.  We had predicted that technical contexts might lead to narrower 
category criteria, as the instructions stressed the importance of producing a fair categorization.  
The right-hand panel of Table 2 shows the mean proportion of positive categorizations.  Contrary 
to expectation, the No-Context Condition had the tightest criterion overall, with 47% positive 
responses, compared to 49% in the other conditions (SE 2.6%).  In no category did the Technical 
Condition, which had been predicted to be the tightest, have the lowest number of positive 
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responses.  The probability data (with an arcsine transformation) were subjected to ANOVAs by 
subjects and items.  None of the effects were consistently significant across both analyses.  
Estimated power to detect a contrast between the No-Context and the other conditions was 70% 
for a difference of as much as .05 in mean probability, and over 90% for a difference greater than 
.07 (df = 57, alpha = .05). 
Discussion 
The experiment set out to examine a number of different measures to test the potential 
effect of a purposive scenario on categorization.  First we looked at levels of agreement and 
consistency in categorization.   No systematic effects were found of supplying a contextual 
scenario.  Second, we examined correlations with typicality and category criterion as a test of the 
idea that "loose" pragmatic contexts would encourage use of default similarity to a common 
prototype and a broad criterion, whereas more technical contexts would encourage explanation-
based categorization and a narrow criterion. The results also failed to support this notion.  In fact 
for 5 of the 8 categories, technical contexts were more similarity-based than were pragmatic 
contexts. 
Only for one category and one context – tools in a department store scenario – did the 
provision of the context systematically affect all of our measures in the predicted way, by (1) 
reducing the vagueness in categorization in terms of less disagreement (17% vs 21%) and greater 
consistency (90% vs. 87%), (2) reducing the correlation with typicality (.86 vs .95) and (3) 
tightening up the category (45% vs 51%).  This consistent pattern is evidence that the 
manipulation of context can work in the predicted way. The interesting point to note is that the 
department store context was in many ways very similar to the types of context used by Roth and 
Shoben (1983), in which provision of a situational setting, such as a farmyard, affected the 
typicality of different birds.  Thus, although we had stressed the purpose of the classification in 
our instructions, the existence of a familiar situational context was probably the key factor in 
changing categorization.  It remains to be seen whether this one case can be generalized. 
Our failure to obtain the predicted effects of context in general across the range of 
measures, suggests either that participants were ignoring the instructions to imagine themselves in 
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the given scenarios, or else that their "default" way of thinking of each category was sufficiently 
powerful to be recruited into the different contexts relatively unchanged.  Against the conclusion 
that the context had no effect at all, one can point to systematic effects observed for sports, 
furniture and tools.  These effects were associated with changes in the categorization of particular 
subcategories of items, such as exercise sports versus skilled sports, or electrical appliances versus 
more decorative furniture.  The most remarkable finding was that the No-Context condition 
showed no systematic differences overall from the other conditions in either its correlation with 
typicality, its category breadth, its between-subject disagreement, or its within-subject 
consistency.  The claim that vagueness in the standard categorization task might generally be the 
result of contextual ambiguity is hard to reconcile with this demonstration. 
One might still argue that the context instruction was not taken sufficiently seriously by 
the participants.  Perhaps they were uninvolved in the task, and so relied on default categorization.  
Accordingly, in Experiment 2 participants were instructed to speak aloud as they read the context 
stories and then to spend a minute describing the basis on which they would categorize, before 
starting to categorize each list.  It would be hard under these circumstances for the participants to 
ignore the stories.  Smith and Sloman (1994) for example found that when asked to "think aloud" 
in one of Rips' (1989) categorization tasks, participants were more likely to show deeper rule-
based as opposed to similarity-based reasoning. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a partial replication of Experiment 1.  We felt that if an effect of context 
were to be observed, the most powerful manipulation would be the contrast between the 
Pragmatic Context, where items should be categorized where people would expect to find them, 
and the Technical Context, where equitable rules and regulations relating to financial and 
professional interests were required.  These were also the only two conditions where there was 
any kind of story provided for participants to read out loud.  We therefore considered just these 
two conditions.   
Method 
Participants.  Forty undergraduate students from the same population at the University of 
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Chicago were paid to participate in the study.  None had taken part in Experiment 1. 
Design and Materials.  The materials and subject population were identical to those of 
Experiment 1, so comparison could be made between experiments.  Twenty participants served in 
each of the two conditions, Pragmatic and Technical.  Each task was only performed once. 
Procedure. Participants were given the booklet and asked to explain out loud the situation 
described.  They then spent a minute reflecting on how they were going to approach each task, 
and what aspects of the category would be important.  An example was given of classifying 
Weapons either for a museum display or for legislating about the legal age for possessing them.  
Participants then gave Yes/No categorization judgments to the 24 words listed in one of two 
orders as in Experiment 1.  Sessions were tape-recorded. 
Results 
Inter-subject Agreement.  The left-hand panel of Table 3 shows the proportion of NMR.  
ANOVAs were run by subjects and items with factors of Condition and Category.  Only the effect 
of Condition was significant across both analyses (F1(1,184) = 21.08, p < .001, F2(1,38) = 8.65, p 
< .01).  NMR was higher in the Technical Condition (21%) than in the Pragmatic Condition (17%, 
SE 0.3%).   As in Experiment 1 the biological categories (17%) showed less disagreement than the 
others (22%), but in this case the Category factor was not significant by items.  Unlike the present 
experiment, Experiment 1 showed no statistically reliable difference in NMR between the 
Pragmatic (17%) and Technical (18%) Conditions.  An ANOVA with factors of Experiment, 
Condition and Category showed a two-way interaction between Experiment and Condition that 
was significant by items (F2(1,184) = 9.72, p < .01), and marginally significant by participants 
(F1(1,114) = 2.9, p < .10).  Comparing Experiments 1 and 2, the level of NMR for the Pragmatic 
Condition was the same (17%), whereas NMR for the Technical Condition increased from 18% to 
21%.  Thus one effect of requiring participants to pay greater attention to the context was 
paradoxically to lead to greater disagreement amongst the participants, but only in the Technical 
Context condition.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Correlation with Typicality.  The central panel of Table 3 shows that correlations of 
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categorization probability with typicality were generally high (mean r = .95).  If a Technical 
context leads to more theoretically based categorization, and less emphasis being placed on 
superficial similarity, then correlations with typicality should be lower for the Technical contexts.  
In the event, all except one of the categories showed higher correlations with typicality in the 
Technical Condition than the Pragmatic Condition (t(7) = 4.29, p < .005, across categories), a 
trend that was present, but not significant in Experiment 1.  Thus the effect of paying more careful 
attention to the task, and verbalizing the process of performing the categorization was that 
participants in the Technical Condition appeared to adhere even more closely to default similarity 
to prototype as the basis for their categorizations. 
Examination of individual category data showed that tools and furniture were subject to 
the same "department store" effect as before, with reduced correlations of categorization with 
typicality in the Pragmatic condition (.86 and .90, compared with .92 to .97 for the rest). For 
example the items telephone, dishwasher, refrigerator, and piano were all less likely to be 
categorized as furniture than predicted by their typicality, and these were all items that would not 
be normally found in the furniture section of a store.   
Criterion.  The overall proportion of positive categorizations in each condition was 
identical (.49) and no different from Experiment 1.  The right-hand panel of Table 3 shows the 
mean categorization probabilities.  Categorization probabilities were also compared (a) to the No-
Context condition of Experiment 1, and (b) to the conditions in Experiment 1 with the identical 
context stories.  There were no systematic changes discernible, although some categories grew 
larger and some smaller when participants were required to verbalize the task. 
Transcripts.  Transcripts of the sessions indicated that participants were clearly aware of 
the requirements of the task, and had fully understood the scenarios.  When asked about the 
intended basis for categorization, participants in both conditions tended to say that it would be 
based on the characteristics of the item and their own “gut feeling” about the category 
membership.  There were some attempts in the Technical scenarios to find defining features, but 
they were not applied systematically.  In sum, the transcripts revealed that participants were taking 
the task seriously and attempting to engage with the scenarios appropriately.  However the 
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categorization data suggest that the basis on which they were categorizing was not markedly 
different from that which they would use in the absence of any particular context.   
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated two conditions of Experiment 1 under instructional conditions 
which would encourage greater attention to the contextual manipulation.   If the failure of 
Experiment 1 to show effects of scenario contexts was owing to participants not reading the 
stories and just proceeding to categorize by default, then we expected the effects originally 
predicted to emerge in this experiment.  The results showed that if anything participants were 
more likely to rely on their default prototype representation of the categories when the task was 
made more explicit and verbal.  Especially in the Technical Condition participants appeared to 
adhere even more closely to default similarity to prototype as the basis for their categorizations, 
and there was an increase in disagreement for this condition compared to Experiment 1.  There 
was no evidence for contextual ambiguity as a source of vague categories.  Nor was there 
evidence for more explanation-based categorization in the Technical Condition, unless the 
increased level of disagreement in that condition reflected a greater diversity of individual rules 
being used by the participants.  In that case, the categorization probabilities could have resembled 
the default through the process of averaging across individual differences.   
Experiment 3 
The third experiment used a different measure of the vagueness of categories.  Kalish 
(1995) presented participants with a categorization scale in which they could either make a clear-
cut Yes or No decision, or else make a graded category membership judgment.  This procedure 
was adapted in Experiment 3 to measure whether participants’ view of the gradedness of 
categorization might be influenced by the different contexts.  Specifically we expected that in the 
pragmatic scenarios, where looser similarity-based classification might be considered appropriate, 
participants would tend to select graded category membership, whereas in the technical scenarios, 
which emphasized the importance of a correct and fair classification, responses would indicate 
clear-cut categorization. 
Method 
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Participants.  Forty undergraduate students at the University of Chicago were paid a small 
amount to participate in the study, with 20 in each of the conditions. 
Materials.  The same categories items and contexts were used as in Experiment 2. 
Design and Procedure. Participants were given the same booklets as in Experiment 2 but 
with a different response scale.  Specific instructions (adapted from Kalish, 1995, Study 1) were 
given on how to use the response scale which consisted of 9 boxes.  At one end was a box marked 
“not at all” and at the other end a box marked “completely”.  These response boxes were to be 
used if an item were clearly in or out of the category, and if category membership was felt to be an 
all-or-none affair just those options were to be used.  Alternatively if a categorization was felt to 
be a matter of degree, a graded response was to be chosen from the boxes labeled 1 to 7 indicating 
increasing degrees of membership from “barely”, through “sort of” to “very much”. 
Results 
Use of Extreme Responses.  The prediction of the experiment concerned the use of the two 
extreme response boxes ("not at all" and "completely") as opposed to selection of a graded 
response.  Figure 3 shows the proportional use of extreme responses as a function of the typicality 
of items (taken from Experiment 1) for each of the conditions.  Judgments of graded membership 
were most common in the center of the typicality scale, where they occurred 25-30% of the time.  
Table 4 shows the percentage of extreme responses given in each condition.  The greater overall 
use of extreme responses for the Pragmatic Condition (85%, S.E. = 2.9%) than for the Technical 
Condition (81%, S.E. = 2.7%) was not significant in the ANOVA by participants (F1<1), nor was 
the interaction with Category.  Estimated power for detecting a difference of 10% or greater 
between condition means was 80%.  The only reliable effect was a main effect of Category 
(F1(7,266) = 4.83, p < .001, F2(7,184) = 5.18, p < .001).  Extreme responses were more common 
for biological categories (87%) than for the others (79%) – a result consistent with earlier research 
(Estes 2003; Kalish, 1995).  Table 4 also shows the number of participants who gave extreme 
responses to all the items in a category.  Five of the 40 participants never used graded responses, 3 
in the Pragmatic and 2 in the Technical condition. In summary, there was no evidence that a 
technical context would lead to the perception that the categorizations were less graded. 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 AND TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
Once again our predictions were unsupported.  When participants were adopting a 
technical context for classification, they were, if anything, less likely to treat the categorization of 
individual items as all-or-none than when giving a pragmatic classification.  If technical contexts 
promote categorization based on deeper theoretical considerations, then this result is very difficult 
to explain.  Choice of a graded categorization response is generally interpreted as indicating 
similarity-based classification in which items may fit into a class more or less well (Estes, 2003; 
Kalish, 1995).  It is striking that there was no significant difference in the use of graded responses 
between the Pragmatic scenarios (where it would be reasonable to use graded categorization) and 
the Technical scenarios (where the use of the categorization for trade or commercial regulations 
suggests an all-or-none categorization needs to be used). 
General Discussion 
The results of the set of three studies described here provide no support for the hypothesis 
that the vagueness of everyday categorization reflects contextual ambiguity in the purpose for 
which the classification is being made, and no support for the contention that people would switch 
to a deeper causal-explanatory basis for categorization when asked to consider categories from a 
more technical perspective.  On the contrary, it appears that similarity, as indexed by context-free 
typicality judgments, provides a powerful predictor of categorization probability across the groups 
in all three of the categorization conditions used.  Asking participants to pay more explicit 
attention to the scenarios (Experiment 2) had an effect on the results, but one that certainly 
showed no sign of bringing them into line with the expected effects.  Indeed, the amount of 
disagreement between participants actually increased and the correlation with typicality was 
stronger in the Technical Condition in Experiment 2, compared with Experiment 1. Measuring the 
degree to which people made all-or-none as opposed to graded categorizations (Experiment 3) 
likewise showed no evidence that they were more likely to treat technical contexts as all-or-none 
classification tasks, compared with pragmatic similarity-based classification.  In fact throughout 
the three studies, it was the technical contexts that tended to show the closest relation between 
Hampton, Dubois & Yeh                                                    Context and Classification  21 
categorization probability and context-free typicality. 
What conclusions may be drawn from these studies?  First, the notion of a robust "default" 
conceptual representation for the semantic categories used here seems to gain considerable 
support.  The pattern of categorization probability changed relatively little as a function of 
different categorization scenarios, suggesting that people were using a similar concept 
representation in each case.  There were some notable effects of condition for particular 
categories.  In Experiments 1 and 2, the Pragmatic Condition which used a department store 
scenario for tools and furniture generated a different pattern of data for those categories.  Even 
though the classification task referred to creating a stock index, rather than the actual lay-out of 
items in the store, the existence of this prior system of classification proved too tempting to 
ignore, and participants tended to classify tools and furniture in terms of what would be found in 
the corresponding departments within the store.  Roth and Shoben (1983) demonstrated a similar 
effect of situational context on category structure.  However whereas they showed that typicality 
within a category shifted with context, our department store effect was reflected in yes/no 
categorization of borderline items. 
Context also had a systematic effect on the classification of sports, such that when 
categorizing for the purposes of a library index typicality was highly predictive of categorization, 
but in other contextual conditions more weight was placed on skill and less on physical effort in 
classifying activities as Sports.  This result however was not apparently owing to ambiguity in the 
meaning of the concept "Sport."  If the context had provided disambiguation, then there should 
have been less disagreement and greater consistency compared with the No-Context control 
condition.  But this was not the case.  It could perhaps be argued that the No-Context condition 
allows participants to recruit the same default context, whereas the scenarios may have themselves 
been ambiguous, thus leading to greater disagreement and inconsistency in the context conditions.  
While this is of course possible, it does not sit easily with explaining vagueness in the absence of 
context in terms of contextual ambiguity.  If the account is unable to predict when contexts will 
increase vagueness and when they will decrease vagueness, then the explanation is empty. 
The overall pattern of our results is clearly one of a failure to find evidence to support our 
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hypotheses.  As such the reader may feel that we have done little but fail to reject the null 
hypothesis.  It is worth therefore pointing out the great contrast between the relatively small and 
subtle effects of the manipulations of purposive context attempted here and the large and robust 
effects of other manipulations of context.  When concepts are placed in a situational context - 
birds on the seashore or vehicles seen from a farmer’s point of view - then a major restructuring of 
the typicality of category members takes place (Roth & Shoben, 1983; Barsalou, 1987).  Barsalou 
found very low correlations between the typicality ordering of category items when very different 
points of view were adopted.  Likewise, Medin et al.’s (1997) tree experts generated completely 
orthogonal structures for classifying of trees depending on the domain of their expertise. We 
believe that similarly large effects would be observed in our experiments if the scenarios had 
highlighted one particular subset of items over another.  For example if the task had been to 
consider what activities should count as sport, in the context of a foundation whose aim is to 
promote public fitness and health, then it is easy to imagine that activities that meet this need (for 
example disco dancing) would be more likely to be included, and those that do not (for example 
chess) would be more likely to be excluded.   However this was not our aim.  
Our primary aim was not only to demonstrate context effects per se, but to test a 
hypothesis concerning category vagueness - namely that at least a part of the disagreement and 
instability observed in categorization is owing to a failure to provide a context for the 
classification, in terms of its purpose or function.  We approached the hypothesis by designing 
scenarios that, taken at face value, presented participants with very different ways of conceiving 
of the purpose of the categorization.  While deliberately not providing a strong bias towards any 
particular subset of the category or any particular feature of category members, we made the 
manipulation of the difference between our two types of scenario as strong as we could.  For 
example there is a very clear difference between deciding whether books on economics should be 
placed in a library index under the general category of Science, and deciding whether a national 
funding body with responsibility for the support of science should be giving grants for research in 
economics.  One purpose we felt, prima facie, called for a pragmatic, similarity-based approach, 
while the other called for the construction of a classification rule that would need to be defended 
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and justified.    
In our second experiment we took steps to ensure that the scenarios were taken seriously 
by requiring participants to talk about the task for a minute before starting their classification.  In 
the third experiment we tried a different dependent variable to measure the degree to which 
participants saw the classification as clear-cut or vague.  In none of our studies did we find a lack 
of purposive context contributing to vagueness in categorization in the standard context-free task 
as observed in countless previous experiments in this field.  The scenarios were direct and easy to 
follow, but they had no effect on consistency.  Nor were the studies underpowered.  The fact that 
subtle effects such as the Pragmatic context effect on Tools and Furniture were identified indicates 
the power of the experiment to detect effects.   Indeed there were significant effects of context 
(see Experiment 2) but where these occurred they were not in the predicted direction. The results 
were consistent across categories and experiments, and the high correlations observed between 
typicality and categorization probability are another indicator of the low error variance in these 
data.  Our measures were accurate, and they revealed that instructional context has little detectable 
effect on categorization probability. 
Taken as a whole, our results strongly suggest that there is a common default way of 
representing conceptual categories and of making category decisions.  No matter whether the 
classification was being created for a tax regulation, or for a news-group search index, the same 
underlying pattern of categorization probabilities emerged, and the same degree of vagueness and 
instability was observed at the category boundary.  Context effects in categorization can be readily 
demonstrated in paradigms where the context invokes a situation with which particular subsets of 
the category are strongly associated (Barsalou, 1987; Roth & Shoben, 1983).  Birds in a farmyard 
have a different graded typicality structure from birds on the seashore.  But they are all still birds.  
Effects on yes/no categorization are harder to demonstrate. 
One of the only successful demonstrations of such effects is the research by Braisby and 
Franks (2000) described in the Introduction.  They deliberately created borderline cases that either 
shared appearance only with a category (a plastic flower or an Easter egg) or shared essence only 
(a dried flower or a scrambled egg).  The weight given to surface appearance as opposed to 
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underlying essence in categorizing instances was shown to change as a function of a number of 
factors affecting the perspective of word use.  Our results suggest that there are limits to the 
generality of these effects.  First, vagueness in categorization was not reduced by providing 
purposive contexts.  Second, there was no shift away from similarity-based categorization when 
more serious consequences could arise from the classification.  It is possible therefore that the 
effects described by Braisby and Franks (2000) are primarily concerned with word use – when 
should you use the word “egg” to refer to a chocolate egg, or the word “chicken” to refer to a 
rubber chicken? 
 We see our results as contributing to the general debate about the stability as opposed to 
context-dependence of conceptual representations (Barsalou, 1987).  At least in respect of 
changing purposive contexts, concepts appear to be remarkably stable. 
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Appendix A 
Items for categorization used in Experiments 1 - 3.   
 
VEGETABLE FRUIT FISH INSECT 
spinach strawberry trout ant 
celery orange salmon wasp 
lettuce banana sardine mosquito 
asparagus watermelon catfish grasshopper 
potato pomegranate goldfish termite 
artichoke tomato shark silkworm 
soybean avocado eel caterpillar 
watercress pumpkin sea horse moth 
parsley olive squid dust mite 
dandelion coconut shrimp head lice 
seaweed cucumber jellyfish maggot 
bamboo shoot eggplant lobster scorpion 
chili pepper acorn starfish centipede 
cloves almond clam spider 
garlic walnut crab tarantula 
sage date tadpole snail 
apple pine cone whale earthworm 
turnip rhubarb seal leech 
peanut sugar beet plankton tapeworm 
bread carrot alligator lizard 
pineapple mushroom oyster bat 
milk ginger sponge hamster  
rice onion gull amoebae 
cereal mint frog bacterium 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
SPORT SCIENCE TOOL FURNITURE 
swimming chemistry axe chair 
tennis mathematics screwdriver table 
skiing astronomy rake bed 
surfing medicine hammer lamp 
jogging meteorology shovel desk 
croquet psychology sewing needle rug 
billiards nutrition funnel television 
ballroom dancing geometry scalpel shelf 
frisbee sociology pitchfork bookends 
wrestling mineralogy calculator curtains 
darts economics dictionary waste basket 
hunting geography tractor dishwasher 
bullfighting dentistry toothbrush cushion 
weightlifting pharmacy broom door mat 
aerobics architecture scissors painting 
fishing archaeology key ashtray 
mountaineering agriculture varnish telephone 
hiking criminology screw refrigerator 
bridge astrology string piano 
kite flying literature umbrella suitcase 
conversation advertising photograph plate 
chess palm reading trunk bucket 
crosswords religious studies pen pillow 
picnicking philosophy stone book 
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Appendix B 
Examples of Pragmatic and Technical Context Scenarios used in all Experiments.   
Technical Scenario for Vegetables.   
The National Administration of Food and Agriculture is planning to regulate the growth of various 
kinds of agricultural produce, so that the quality of the produce in the market can be monitored.  
Imagine that you belong to a panel of advisors for the Administration of Food and Agriculture to 
provide help in drafting the regulation.  In the chapter for vegetables, you want to include all 
produce that should be considered as vegetables, excluding other kinds of agricultural produce, 
which would be covered under other chapters.  Because the regulation affects vegetable farmers 
nationwide, a clear categorization of vegetables will thus ensure a fair and reasonable regulation.   
Consider each of the following items, and decide whether acting in the panel of advisors, you 
would classify the item in the category of vegetables. 
Pragmatic Scenario for Furniture 
Klein, which is a department store, is designing a sorting system to list the items in stock, as well 
as their prices and quantities.  Marketing persons in the store can quickly obtain information about 
these items by using such a system.  Imagine that you work for the department store to develop 
the sorting system.  You have to categorize selling items under different headings, so that 
marketing persons can search for information easily and quickly.  The following is a list of items 
from the department store.  You have to decide whether or not they should be included in the 
category of furniture, so that most marketing persons would be able to find things under the 
category heading where they expected to find them. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Non-Modal Responses and Percentage of Categorization Responses Remaining the Same at Retest as a Function of Condition 
and Category for Experiment 1.        
 Percentage Non-Modal Responses (NMR)  Percentage Categorization Responses Remaining the Same 
Category No-Context Pragmatic Technical Overall  No-Context Pragmatic Technical Overall 
Vegetable 17 15 14 16  92 90 92 92 
Fruit 15 17 14 15  94 92 88 91 
Fish 9 11 11 10  97 94 95 95 
Insect 18 17 18 18  89 94 89 91 
Sport 23 19 24 22  86 88 89 87 
Science 26 23 24 24  88 90 85 87 
Tool 24 17 20 20  87 90 86 87 
Furniture 17 18 19 18  89 93 85 88 
   Overall 18.6 17.1 18.0 17.9  90 91 89 90 
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Table 2 
Correlation of Categorization Probability with Typicality and Percentage of Positive Categorizations, as a Function of Condition and 
Category in Experiment 1. 
 
 Correlation of Categorization with Typicality  Percentage of Positive Categorizations 
Category No-Context Pragmatic Technical Overall  No-Context Pragmatic Technical Overall 
Vegetable .96 .97 .94 .96  53 53 57 53 
Fruit .94 .96 .97 .96  40 45 42 42 
Fish .95 .96 .95 .95  29 33 33 33 
Insect .98 .97 .99 .98  55 59 52 54 
Sport .87 .96 .91 .91  56 57 56 57 
Science .92 .92 .96 .93  54 61 60 61 
Tool .97 .86 .94 .94  52 45 50 51 
Furniture .95 .90 .96 .94  39 39 39 39 
   Overall .94 .94 .95 .95  47 49 49 49 
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Table 3 
Percentage of Non-Modal Responses (NMR), Correlation of Categorization Probability with Typicality, and Mean Categorization 
Probability as a Function of Condition and Category for Experiment 2, and for the No-Context condition of Experiment 1.  
 Percentage of NMR Correlation with Typicality Categorization Probability 
Category Pragmatic Technical Pragmatic Technical Pragmatic Technical No-Context (from Expt 1) 
Vegetable 15 20 .95 .96 .51 .51 .53 
Fruit 13 16 .95 .97 .38 .41 .40 
Fish 16 19 .96 .97 .39 .41 .29 
Insect 16 21 .97 .98 .46 .50 .55 
Sport 20 26 .93 .96 .64 .51 .56 
Science 19 26 .93 .93 .64 .60 .54 
Tool 20 27 .89 .95 .47 .58 .52 
Furniture 18 16 .91 .95 .42 .37 .39 
   Mean 17 21 .94 .96 .49 .49 47 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Extreme Responses, and Number of Participants (out of 20) Giving All 
Extreme Responses as a Function of Condition and Category for Experiment 3 
 
     CONTEXT CONDITION 
Category Pragmatic Technical 
 Percent Number Percent Number 
Vegetable 84 5 84 7 
Fruit 89 7 90 10 
Fish 89 13 79 6 
Insect 93 10 87 10 
Sport 79 6 70 5 
Science 86 9 82 7 
Tool 82 8 78 3 
Furniture 76 7 80 7 
   Mean 85 8.1 81 6.9 
 




Scatter Plots of Categorization Probability with Typicality for Each Category in the No-
Context Condition of Experiment 1. 
Figure 2. 
Scatter Plots of Categorization Probability with Typicality for Sports in the Technical 
Context Condition, and for Furniture in the Pragmatic Context Condition in Experiment 1. 
Figure 3 
Stacked Bars Representing the Distribution of Responses for Each Condition in Experiment 3 
Between Clearly Yes, Clearly No and Graded (1-7) Categorization Responses.
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